When discussing complex socioeconomic questions at an abstract, ideal level, a question that is often unclear is of the degree of specificity that our conclusions may defensibly take. My criticism of Why Not Capitalism?
argument would struggle to fully justify some of the particular features of capitalist practice it appeared to advocate. In response, Jason Brennan suggests that the points I raise do not call into question the ideal judgement that capitalism be favoured over socialism, but rather open up another 'intramural debates' (Brennan 2017, p. 110) about the type of capitalism that should be favoured. This response is helpful, in that, as I aim to demonstrate in this reply, it clarifies the overall ambition of WNC's argument: we should read Brennan's book as offering a broad, yet modest, argument for preferring some form of capitalism to socialism, as opposed to taking it to provide a more expansive argument in favour of an ideal type of capitalism to be implemented to its fullest.
To clarify what I mean by this, it may be helpful to clearly state these alternative interpretations of the main claim of WNC: -WNC (modest): thinking about the form of economic organization we would favour under ideal conditions gives us reasons to prefer capitalism, broadly understood as a family of economic systems whose institutional forms (such as private property and markets) aim to support a plurality of individual purposes, over socialism; -WNC (expansive): thinking about the form of economic organization we would favour under ideal conditions gives us reasons to prefer capitalism, understood as a distinct economic system with well specified features, over socialism.
The key difference between the two, then, is that, for the modest claim to hold, the key defining features of capitalism would have to be present in some form or quantity, but there would remain significant scope for determination of the optimum arrangement, whereas the expansive claim would hold that the aim should be to maximize these features. The expansive claim would allow us to say that a more capitalist system would be preferable to a less capitalist alternative, where advancing the modest claim would mean that, absent further argument, we would have to refrain from judging between differing systems, so long as each recognizably fell within the broad family of capitalist options. Now, within the text, there is no decisive statement that would render either of these interpretations to be implausible. There is, however, some textual evidence that might appear to show Brennan leaning towards the expansive claim. For instance, Brennan outlines three distinctive features of capitalism, defining them in the following way:
(1) extensive private property, especially in productive capital goods or "the means of production", (2) voluntary trading of private property on the market, and (3) that every person possesses an extensive sphere of economic liberty in which she may make decisions as she pleases. (Brennan 2014, p. 75) The inclusion of the qualifier 'extensive' in two of the three features does appear to suggest that the broadest scope for these two qualities would be preferable. As a result, some systems that might fall under a broad definition of capitalismfor instance, forms of welfare-state capitalism or property-owning democracywould be open to criticism if the access to private property or economic liberty they provide is less extensive than could possibly be secured.
Another possible indicator of Brennan's intentions comes when, in the clearest and most succinct characterization of the nature of the capitalist ideal he has drawn, Brennan states that the 'Mickey Mouse Clubhouse Village has a voluntaryist, anarchist, capitalist, libertarian structure.' (Brennan 2014, p. 95) The fact that capitalism is simply one of four components of the character of this ideal suggests that the ideal itself is not just reflective of capitalism, but rather of a particular subset of all possible capitalist forms: those of a voluntaryist, anarchist and libertarian character. As a result, again the reader may be inclined to interpret WNC as advancing the expansive claim.
Indeed, my criticisms of the book are largely reliant upon such a reading. My objection is that, while his argument may be capable of demonstrating that a (broadly understood) capitalist form of socioeconomic organization may be preferable to socialism, Brennan fails to provide sufficient reason for us to endorse a more defined capitalist scheme. So, if Brennan wishes to emphasize voluntaryist, anarchist or libertarian features as being essential to the capitalist ideal, more argument would be required. Yet, in addition to this, I also offer some doubt as to whether a scheme displaying such characteristics would even be the form of capitalism (again, understood in its broader sense) capable of best reflecting the normative content of the reasons Brennan provides for rejecting socialism. As such, my criticisms are addressed primarily at the expansive reading of the book's claim. Were its argument to take the more modest form, then it would avoid the main force of my criticism.
This, then, is what makes Brennan's response so illuminating, as he appears to firmly commit to the modest version of WNC's claim. Two components of Brennan's response back up this interpretation. Firstly, while he notes that the question of how to handle rivalrous plans is one that faces any form of socioeconomic regime, he does not seek to problematize my gestures towards a system featuring a singular and relatively interventionist authority as being a proposal that either goes beyond or lies outside the bounds of capitalism. Thus, while undoubtedly further argument would be required to settle the question of which form of capitalism would be most favourable, Brennan seems quite happy to concede that, for the purposes of such an argument, systems such as property-owning democracy should be regarded as lying within the set of eligible options.
Further to this, though, the more decisive commitment to the modest claim comes with Brennan's declaration that he does not view my comments as comprising a criticism of the argument of his book, but rather as opening up a debate within capitalism about its precise features. The fact that such a debate remains, and is separate to the arguments of the book, makes it clear that Brennan does not himself think that WNC settles the question of the specific type of capitalism that is most justified.
2 Indeed, it also implies that we should be wary of treating the Mickey Mouse Clubhouse Village as representing the ideal of capitalist utopia; some of its features may be far from necessary for a system to qualify as belonging to the broad family of capitalist views. This clarification, then, may assist Brennan in allowing a broader range of views to be compatible with the key claim of his book: that in the ideal there are reasons to favour capitalism -understood broadly as a family of economic systems that attempt to facilitate plural individual plans -over socialism. But there are costs to modesty. A broader, less determined claim leaves more questions unanswered. Brennan acknowledges this in relation to the questions I raise about the ideal scope of competition within capitalism. But beyond thisin regard to such issues as the ideal capitalist relation between market and overseeing authority or as to the appropriate level of regulation or mitigation of market outcomes -it likewise appears that further questions remain.
